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Do Liquidated Damages Clauses Affect
Strategic Mortgage Default Morality?
A Test of the Disjunctive Thesis
Michael J. Seiler
We test the disjunctive thesis as it relates to mortgage contracts and find that
a liquidated damages clause shifts ones view of a mortgage from a promise
to perform to either a promise to perform or pay compensatory damages.
However, when a strategic mortgage default is responsible for the breach,
the perceived immorality of this action overwhelms the liquidated damages
clause effect in support of the disjunctive thesis. We also find that people’s
conscious “experimentally stated preference” moral stance on installment loan
(mortgages, auto loans, credit card debt and even cell phone contracts) de-
fault significantly differs from their subconscious “experimentally revealed pref-
erence” moral stance indicating a difference between what people say they
believe and what they actually believe.
Introduction
For over a century there has raged a great debate in contracts theory as to
whether a legal contract represents a (1) promise to perform, versus (2) a
promise to perform or pay compensatory damages (Oliver Wendell Homes,
Jr. 1897). The former, more restrictive notion is formally known as the “Dis-
junctive Thesis.” Wilkinson-Ryan (2012) puts a finer point on the debate by
asking the question “Is a contract the same thing as a promise?” People who
view a contract as a promise (to perform) tend to view a breach of contract
as the breaking of a promise. As such, the act of breach is viewed as being
immoral. Conversely, those who reject the disjunctive thesis and view a con-
tract as an option to either perform or pay (compensatory) damages, do not
find breach of contract to be immoral.
As it relates to strategic mortgage default, the voluntary cessation of paying
ones monthly mortgage payment even though he has the financial means to
continue making payments, studies have found that 80%–90% of the public
*Department of Finance, Raymond A. Mason School of Business, The College of
William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA 23186 or Michael.Seiler@mason.wm.edu.
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view strategic default as immoral (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales 2013, Fannie
Mae 2010).1 In a nonreal estate setting, Wilkinson-Ryan (2010) posits that
people generally view a contract as a promise to perform. However, when the
contract contains a liquidated damages clause (stating how much one party
is to be compensated when the other party breaches), many shift their stance
and begin to view the contract as either a promise to perform or pay damages.
In a real estate setting, Wilkinson-Ryan (2011) discusses the potential appli-
cation of these concepts to strategic mortgage default. However, she performs
three empirical vignette experiments on other aspects of default which we
do not address in this study. Specifically, Wilkinson-Ryan (2011) empirically
examines people’s willingness to strategically default when home prices drop
in decile increments under three conditions: when the lender has engaged in
egregious behavior—issuing subprime loans and receiving government bailout
funds (Study 1), when the lender is a local versus an international bank—an
examination of “social distance” (Study 2), and when mortgage defaults are
more commonplace—an examination of “social norms” (Study 3).
We improve upon the Wilkinson-Ryan (2010, 2011, 2012) studies in a number
of ways. We (1) simultaneously examine and compare strategic mortgage
default to a number of other types of consumer loans, (2) perform multivariate
statistical analysis (as opposed to just univariate), (3) create an experimental
environment that is more generalizable (i.e., less locational, loan, and context
specific), (4) collect a greater number of borrower demographic variables, (5)
concatenate the dataset with many additional explanatory variables and (6)
use a much larger sample size.
Specifically in this study, we empirically test whether the presence of a
liquidated damages clause causes a mortgage contract to shift from being
viewed as a promise to perform versus a promise to either perform or pay.
We then test to see if default intent (economic vs. strategic) has any impact
on the result. Moving more broadly, we expand the analysis to then examine
how residential mortgage defaults compare to defaults on other installment
loans such as auto loans, credit cards and even phone contracts. Finally,
using the concept of a psychological contract,2 we identify the individual
characteristics within people that cause them to view the morality of mortgage
default differentially.
1Seiler (2015a, b) argues that it is for this reason that strategic mortgage default is not
far more commonplace.
2A legal contract is one that is recognized and enforceable by a court of law. A
psychological contract is how a specific party to that contract views the terms of the
agreement. The party’s viewpoint may well be flawed and even unenforceable.
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We find that a liquidated damages clause does indeed alter the applicability
of the disjunctive thesis to mortgage defaults. Moreover, when the default
was strategic in nature, people are so morally opposed to the breach that
the liquidated damages clause effect is overwhelmed by the strategic de-
fault effect. Also, breaching a mortgage contract is relatively on par with
the breaching of auto loans, credit card debt and phone contracts. However,
people’s experimentally stated versus revealed preferences across each loan
type are significantly different. That is, what they say they believe is incon-
gruent with what we find them to believe, empirically. Finally, the individual
characteristics of those who find mortgage default to be less immoral include
(1) blaming the lender more so than the borrower for the financial crisis,
(2) those who have previously defaulted on a mortgage, (3) those who have
specifically strategically defaulted on a mortgage in the past, (4) those who
reside in states hardest hit by the housing crisis, (5) those without children
and (6) minorities.
The remainder of the study is as follows. We next turn to a discussion
of arguments in favor of and against strategic mortgage default. Then, we
review the foundational papers of Wilkinson-Ryan (2010, 2011, 2012). Next,
we present an experimental design to test our hypotheses followed by a
description of our data and data collection method. The results describe our
findings, and then the paper concludes.
Morality Debates Relating to Mortgage Default
The morality of mortgage default is greatly debated in both the popular press
and within academic journals. This section highlights the core arguments to
emphasize the many subtle nuances relating to this hotly debated issue.
Arguments in Favor of Mortgage Default Morality
After a mortgage default and eventual foreclosure that occurred in a recourse
state,3 lenders are only allowed to seek a deficiency judgment for compen-
satory damages, not for punitive damages. Punitive damages are those that
are awarded to the breached party to punish the breaching party. White (2010)
argues that the presence or absence of punitive damages signals whether the
breach represents an immoral act. A counter position is taken by Bridgeman
(2011) who additionally argues that even if punitive damages were allowed
3In a recourse state, the lender can seize not only the home, but can come after the
borrower for missed payments, interests, late penalties, costs to foreclose on the home
and so forth. Alternatively, in a non-recourse state, the lender’s only recourse in the
event of default is to seize the home—which serves as the collateral basis of the loan.
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in a mortgage setting, it still would not make it acceptable for the borrower
to breach his agreement. Consider the example of a burglar who is willing
to risk going to prison if he is caught breaking into a store. A willingness to
pay punitive damages (going to prison) does not make breaking into a store
morally justifiable.4
Laws within a society generally reflect the moral values of its citizens. As
such, a second legal observation suggesting the courts do not view strategic
mortgage default as immoral is that even when compensatory damages are
allowed, they are often mitigated. For example, Congress passed into law the
elimination of a tax liability on forgiven mortgage debt. Alternatively stated,
if a lender writes down a borrower’s debt from $300,000 to $100,000, it used
to be the case that the borrower would have to claim the difference ($200,000)
as income and pay taxes accordingly. Counter arguments to this observation
are that the government is not allowing this debt forgiveness to be untaxed
because of its stance on mortality, but because it does not want the heavy tax
burden to quell mortgage workout solutions out of a concern that it might
further undermine economic recovery efforts.
A more permanent legal argument supporting the morality of strategic mort-
gage default is that in the event of bankruptcy, unpaid mortgage debt can
be forgiven/reduced in both a Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 filing. This places
mortgage debt on the level of credit card and other forms of unsecured
debt. Alternatively, student loans and taxes are not forgiven in the event of
bankruptcy. A counter-argument to this stance taken by the United States
government is that bankruptcy laws are written to protect the government’s
assets to a higher standard than protecting a corporation’s assets, not to speak
to the morality of various types of loans. To explain, taxes get collected by
local, state and the federal government. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code does not
absolve this debt because doing so is not in the government’s self-interest.
By similar reasoning, absolving student loans is a macroeconomic concern
because it affects education, which has a national platform.
To delve deeper into the argument and to support the claim that the gov-
ernment places their asset protection above that of a corporation, consider
that when filing for bankruptcy, retirement and child education saving funds
(subject to a 12-month look back) are untouchable by creditors in the event of
bankruptcy. This means that a strategic defaulter can deposit the money he is
not paying on his mortgage into an Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs),
4If this argument does not seem strong enough, consider a person’s willingness to
murder someone and pay both compensatory damages (say $10 million) as well as
punitive damages (death by electrocution).
208 Seiler
401k, a child’s education fund, etc., and those funds will be completely pro-
tected in bankruptcy. Clearly, the government is expropriating wealth from
current creditors to future taxpayers (via lesser reliance on social security by
the strategic defaulter and a greater attainment of education for the children
of strategic mortgage defaulters).
On a related note, bankruptcy laws are associated with state-specific personal
and home exemptions. This simply means that in the event of bankruptcy,
filers are allowed to keep a “reasonable” level of wealth in assets deemed
important and/or necessary. Although it could be argued that these provisions
are just another example of society’s stamp of moral approval, others would
vehemently argue that these caps do not make strategic default (and the often
linked strategic bankruptcy) morally copasetic by the same reasoning that
being willing to go to prison for burglary does not morally justify stealing.
Wheaton, Nechayev and Seiler (2015) argue that strategic mortgage defaults
are a market clearing necessity that has the further benefit of imposing a much
needed discipline on a lending industry that ran amuck. In support of this ar-
gument, Wilkinson-Ryan (2012) introduces the discussion of a psychological
contract. A legal contract represents what a court of law would uphold based
on what is written into the contract. A psychological contract reflects what a
party to the contract believes or interprets the contract to contain.5 It is im-
portant to note that even though the psychological contract can be completely
incorrect and therefore entirely unenforceable, it still impacts how the party
treats the contract as behaviorally binding their actions. Wilkinson-Ryan ar-
gues that there are two remedies for breach of a psychological contract:
retaliation or exit.6 As it relates to borrowing money, the retaliation could
come in the form of a strategic mortgage default (Wilkinson-Ryan 2011,
Seiler 2014a). This action exemplifies the imposed discipline referenced by
Wheaton, Nechayev and Seiler (2015).
We are loath to give credence to arguments that strategic mortgage defaults are
not immoral based on the observations that lenders rarely pursue deficiency
amounts left by defaulting borrowers because too many counter explanations
5Individuals are notorious for injecting their personal viewpoints into a contract where
the law clearly states their position has no legal bearing. As an example, when asked
if infidelity matters in a divorce proceeding, most individuals would say the cheating
spouse would lose many rights and privileges. The reality, however, is that several
states are “no fault” states meaning that who committed the infidelity has no impact
on the divorce proceeding.
6In an employment setting, retaliation might come in the form of taking longer breaks,
performing at a sub-par level, spreading discontent around the office and the like. Exit
clearly implies leaving the company for another job.
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exist for this lender behavior. For example, although it is true that lenders
rarely pursue deficiency judgments, the reasons for this inaction is more likely
attributed to the cost to pursue such legal engagements, a lack of manpower
to pursue such collection efforts, and most likely, the desire to avoid throwing
good money after bad. Alternatively stated, many defaulters do not have the
financial means to make it worth the lender’s time and money to pursue a
claim they will certainly be awarded by the court, but may possibly never
receive because of the borrower’s financial standing. In a similar fashion, the
common willingness to settle the debt based on the unpaid balance (UPB) at
the time of default without consideration of missed payments, penalties and
interest, and so forth, has little to do with morality and more to do with a
financial calculation of return on (future) investment. This willingness to settle
for less is exaggerated when a second lien holder is involved (Been, Jackson
and Willis 2012, Bond et al. 2012, Lee, Mayer and Tracy 2012, Agarwal et al.
2015) or when the property is located in a judicial foreclosure state where
the time to proceed through a foreclosure can be extremely lengthy (Ghent
and Kudlyak 2011, Harrison and Seiler 2015).7
Arguments Against Mortgage Default Morality
The strongest argument against the morality of strategic mortgage default is
that most people view entering into a contract as tantamount to making a
promise. And, for the most part, people feel strongly that breaking a promise
is immoral. Unlike breaking a promise to an individual, breaching a mortgage
causes real financial damages not just to the other party, but to society as a
whole. In this sense, breaching a mortgage contract is like breaking a promise
to everyone, not just to a single lender.
As discussed in the previous section, in the event of bankruptcy, unsecured
corporate debt and mortgages are lower on the pecking order than paying off
taxes and student loans. When a lender or credit card company experiences a
loss, this raises the future cost of borrowing for everyone, not just the strategic
defaulter. Thus, strategic defaulters (many times using the U.S. bankruptcy
Code as a shield), expropriate wealth from Wall Street which in turn must
make up for those losses by collecting from Main Street. By way of the
transitive property, strategic defaulters cause financial damage to everyone.
7Seiler et al. (2012) document that people have an extremely limited understanding of
foreclosure laws, recourse versus non-recourse states, bankruptcy laws, etc., whereas
Seiler (2014b) discusses that even attorneys who specialize in settling mortgage default
disputes have little predictive ability of how these laws will come together to affect
the outcome of a settlement agreement.
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In a more direct sense, these spillover effects are well documented in a geospa-
tial setting, also referred to as the foreclosure contagion effect (Immergluck
and Smith 2006, Harding, Rosenblatt and Yao 2009, Lin, Rosenblatt and Yao
2009; Rogers and Winter 2009, Campbell, Giglio and Pathak 2011, Gerardi
et al. 2013). When a single home in a neighborhood goes into foreclosure,
that home sells for less, slightly lowering the value of the homes around it
(Clauretie and Daneshvary 2011). When a second home goes into foreclo-
sure, surrounding property values drop even further. As more homes go into
foreclosure, the foreclosure discount increases at an increasing rate potentially
collapsing a housing market (Gangel, Seiler and Collins 2013). This localized
view of the impact of strategic mortgage defaulters on those around them is
more easily seen by the general public as a true external cost imposed by
strategic mortgage defaulters.
A more abstract, but still legitimate reason to view strategic mortgage de-
fault as immoral is that if too many borrowers strategically default, it erodes
confidence in the overall lending system, encourages the moral hazard prob-
lem (i.e., encourages more borrowers to follow suit), and thus further raises
the cost of borrowing (Miller 2011). In the extreme, widespread default can
cause financial panics which can result in a liquidity crisis which can bring a
financial market sector to a grinding halt.8
Wilkinson-Ryan Foundational Studies
The primary focus of Wilkinson-Ryan (2010) is to examine whether or not a
liquidated damages clause causes people to view a breach of contract as being
less immoral. The idea is that in the absence of a liquidated damages clause,
people act according to the social norm. In the United States, most people
view a contract as a promise to perform, not a promise to perform or pay
just compensation. As such, breach of contract feels like breaking a promise,
which people view as morally wrong. However, when a contract specifically
includes the remedies available in the event of a breach, people shift their
view of the contract from a promise to perform to an option to either perform
or pay damages, resulting in a reduction in the moral impact of a breach.
Wilkinson-Ryan (2010) performed three vignette experiments to test this idea.
The first setting involved the rental of a restaurant for a party and a training
seminar for workers at a temp agency. Using a sample size of 99 (72 of
which were females), Wilkinson-Ryan found support for her hypotheses.9
8Consider the case of Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) during the
financial crisis.
9The only demographic data collected were age and gender.
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The second vignette introduced a penalty clause and found that people prefer
to breach a contract with a penalty clause even though it is more expensive
to do so. In the final vignette, the author asked nine questions to further
understand the thought process people went through when thinking about
liquidated damaged clauses in contracts.
Wilkinson-Ryan (2011) qualitatively argues that the conclusions from her
2010 study could apply to real estate in a strategic mortgage default setting.
However, she did not at all test for the effects of a liquidated damages clause
in any of her three vignette experiments (as we do in this study). Instead,
her goal was to examine potential psychological triggers that might reframe
a borrower’s perception of a foreclosure as an option within the contract
as opposed to default representing a moral dilemma. Study 1 examined the
effect of lender characteristics (lenders who received government bailout
funds vs. those who did not and those who did vs. did not engage in subprime
lending) on borrowers’ willingness to strategically default when home prices
dropped by deciles stepping from 0% to 100%. As hypothesized, lenders who
behaved more egregiously were met with a greater willingness by borrowers
to strategically default while experiencing less moral contemplation.
This first vignette solicited 153 borrower opinions (70% of which were fe-
males) by creating a setting where they were asked to imagine they bought a
home in CA in 2005 for $500,000 via a subprime, interest-only, non-recourse
loan, using no down payment. They further informed borrowers that their
home is worth much, much less and that the lender refused to modify their
loan. Subjects were also told their credit report would be adversely affected
for the next 7 years (which is inaccurate in most cases). Still, they were
told they would save “substantial amounts of money” by walking away even
after controlling for the credit hit (having bad credit makes obtaining future
credit both more difficult and more expensive). While clearly there are many
restrictive assumptions being made in this experimental setting, as is often
necessary in an attempt to isolate the variable of interest—in this case, the
hypothesized increased willingness to strategically default when the other
party to a contract (i.e., the lender) has behaved egregiously. Study 1 found
statistical significance using a within subjects design, but not when employing
a between subjects design.
In the second vignette, Wilkinson-Ryan (2011) uses the same 153 respondents
to test whether or not loan characteristics (i.e., those held in local lender
portfolios versus those sold into the secondary market) has any effect on a
borrower’s willingness to strategically default. The reasoning is that borrowers
who originate loans with a local bank with whom they have a relationship are
less inclined to default when compared to a distant, nameless, faceless bank
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with whom they have no relationship or strong association. Simply stated,
it is easier to default on a stranger than to default on a friend. Her results
support her “social distance” hypothesis.
The third vignette in Wilkinson-Ryan (2011) tested the question that if loan
default was more commonplace, would it make it more likely that the marginal
borrower would associate this increased frequency with a decreased stigma
effect resulting in a greater willingness to default? She argues that placing a
foreclosure sign in a defaulter’s yard when few defaulters exist creates a level
of shame that works as a deterrent to future potential defaulters. However, if
foreclosure signs become commonplace, then the stigma/shame of default is
mitigated because everyone is doing it. More formally, a shift in the social
norm (from not defaulting to defaulting) lessens the immorality of strategic
mortgage default. Using a sample of 100 people, the author finds significant
results with the between subjects design (but not in the within subjects design).
Finally, Wilkinson-Ryan (2012) provided a qualitative discussion of psycho-
logical contracts (but no empirical testing), tying together many of the ideas
from her past studies, among others. Our study applies many of the legal
concepts from Wilkinson-Ryan (2010, 2011, 2012), but does not repeat any
of her tests. Instead, we seek to improve upon her studies by examining
morality surrounding breach of a number of consumer contracts including
mortgages, auto, credit card and phone contracts, conduct multivariate statis-
tical analysis rather than simple univariate tests, incorporate a greater number
of demographic and other potential explanatory variables, create an experi-
mental environment that is less assumption restrictive, and use a much greater
sample size.
Experimental Design
Bhutta, Dokko and Shan (2011) provide several reasons why experimental
data are needed to examine strategic mortgage default related issues. In fact,
the case becomes even stronger when specifically examining the fine points
of morality as it relates to strategic mortgage default. For example, nowhere
in transactions (secondary) data are measures of moral viewpoint collected.
As such, if one wants to understand more about the issue, (primary) data must
be collected.
We begin by creating a 2×3 “between subjects” experimental design where
the first treatment is a liquidated damages clause versus the absence of such
a clause. As explained previously, the hypothesis is that when a liquidated
damages clause is added to the contract, people will view the contract as
less of a promise to perform and more of a promise to either perform or pay
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damages. The second treatment has three variants. This treatment differenti-
ates between a strategic mortgage default, and economic default, and a default
where no reason is provided. We hypothesize that because of the default in-
tent, strategic mortgage default will be viewed significantly differently from
the others.
Since stated preferences (what people say they would do in a situation) are
not always consistent with revealed preferences (what people actually do), we
follow an experimentally revealed preference design.10 This is accomplished
by creating six unique treatments or paths, only one of which each participant
follows, being completely unaware that the other five paths exist and also
being completely unaware of the goal of our research. Participants are only
told that we are doing research on the housing market—which is self-evident
upon reading our first question. Our six (2×3) treatments are as follows:
(A) = a contract with a stated Liquidated Damages clause, (B) = a contract
without a stated Liquidated Damages clause; (1) neutral (no reason given for
the default), (2) informing the participant that the default was strategic and
(3) informing the participant that the default was economic in nature. Below
is what the participant read. Note that the italicized words inside the brackets
were not visible to the participant, but serve only to convey all six variants to
readers of this study to highlight the points of differentiation.
“A couple bought their home a while back. Today, because home prices
have fallen so far, they now owe much more on the loan than the home is
worth.
[Liquidated Damages clause—which either is or is not present]
Within the mortgage contract, it states that if the borrower fails to make
his monthly payment, the home will be taken away and sold for whatever
the market will pay at that time. Any remaining amount still owed to the
lender will have to be paid by the borrower to make the lender “whole.”
In other words, the lender will receive the same rate of return on this loan
whether the borrower defaults or not.
[no Default Intent provided] The couple has stopped making their monthly
mortgage payments.
10Samuelson (1938) identified a revealed preference as one that reflects a consumer’s
behavior when actually making a purchase or decision. Since our results are based on
an experiment, as opposed to an actual transaction, in deference to Paul Samuelson,
we refer throughout this study as the subject indicating an experimentally stated
preference versus an experimentally revealed preference.
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[Strategic Default intent provided] This couple can afford to make their
payments, but has stopped making monthly mortgage payments because
they believe it is no longer in their best financial interests.
[Economic Default intent provided] After a series of financial setbacks
brought on by an unexpected major illness, this couple is no longer able,
and has thus stopped making their monthly mortgage payments.
Please rate the morality of the couple no longer making their monthly
payments: scale 18 (1 = immoral to 8 = moral).”
It is our intended purpose to remove the financial consideration from the
calculation and to instead focus on the differentiation between a promise to
perform versus a promise to either perform or pay damages. To this end, we
begin by being intentionally vague on exactly how long this situation has
been ongoing (“A couple bought their home a while back”). Also note that
the liquidated damages clause states that the breached party is financially
unaffected by whether or not the borrower defaults (“ . . . the lender will
receive the same rate of return on this loan whether the borrower defaults or
not”).
Wilkinson-Ryan (2011) correctly asserts that lenders are affected when bor-
rowers default even in recourse states because of bankruptcy law protections,
a lack of borrower assets/income, varying state foreclosure laws, differential
legal costs, labor force restrictions, foreclosure contagion effects and so forth.
A counter-argument is that although a loss may occur on an individual loan
level, banks have experienced record profits during the recession (despite his-
torically high mortgage default rates) due to an ability to raise interest rates
on different types of new consumer loans, charge higher fees, being “too big
to fail,” and so forth. However, the purpose of this study is not to debate the
net impact of the housing crisis on lenders. Instead, the experimental design
clarification is meant to hold constant the financial impact consideration, thus
allowing for a pure test of our hypothesis. In this sense, this experimental
assumption is like other necessary assumptions that may depart from reality
in order to hold all other variables constant. Specifically, we ask respon-
dents to hold constant the financial impact on the lender in order to examine
the central research question, “Does a liquidated damages clause convert a
promise to perform into a promise to either perform or pay damages?” without
confounding the issue. To the extent respondents can accept our established
parameter, this provides a direct test of the disjunctive thesis.
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Our second treatment effect, default intent, comes in three variants: no reason
given for the default, strategic default and economic default. So as not to
require participants to know these definitions, we simply describe the sce-
narios that reflect the underlying definitions, just as we did the liquidated
damages clauses. In the Results section, we compare morality scores and
draw inferences from these tests.
Data
All data are collected through an on-line platform where homeowners stand
ready to participate in studies such as these for a fee11. Within this network,
there exists a clearinghouse, who acts as an independent middleman offering
certain protections for both researchers and participants. Examples of par-
ticipant protections include ensuring their complete anonymity, guaranteeing
payment for services (subject to approval by the researcher) and so forth. For
the researcher, participant ratings are reported by past researchers to ensure
the participant has taken the task seriously and completed it with a high
degree of quality. We set this past approval rating at a minimum of 95% in
order for a participant to be allowed in our study.12 In addition to requir-
ing the clearing of past approval rating hurdles, we take additional response
quality precautions by creating two simple questions dispersed throughout
the experiment where all the participant has to do is read a statement that
tells them to answer, say “7,” on the scale from 1 to 9. With two of these
questions throughout, there is only a 1 in 81 chance that the participant is
randomly clicking on the correct answers without reading the questions.
More subtly, we place hidden timers on all screens of the experiment and know
exactly how long (down to the milli-second) each participant stayed on a page
before moving to the next screen. Someone who fails to read our question
and randomly clicks an answer is easily identified by an unreasonably short
time spent on the page.13 The better the screens placed on the experiment,
the more accurate the testing of our hypotheses. It is important to point out
that if participants do not take the experiment seriously, and hurry through it
11Unlike a wealth maximization study where a clear end goal is established (such as
maximizing the return on an investment), our study of morality does not have “right”
or “wrong” answers. For this reason, we do not compensate based on “performance,”
but instead pay a flat fee to compensate participants for their time. This is the standard
operating procedure for this type of study.
12In return for their clearinghouse services, the company charges a 10% fee to the
researcher.
13The robustness of our results is examined by testing various timer filters for each of
our key questions. Results are not sensitive to these cutoffs which admittedly should
vary based on people’s differential reading speeds.
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without offering deep consideration for what is written, this works towards a
null result. In this sense, there is an added incentive to design a high-level of
quality control within the experiment.
We posted this experiment in the summer of 2014, and allowed the first
2,000 homeowners who responded from across the country to participate.
When participants enter our experiment, they are randomly assigned to just
one of the six treatments, having no idea other treatments even exist. Of the
2,000 respondents, 62 observations were jettisoned for a variety of screening
reasons, resulting in a final sample size of 1,938 valid and complete responses.
Homeowners from all 50 states plus DC are represented in our sample. To
our knowledge, this sample size constitutes the largest experimental sample
ever collected.
The average age of our participants is 36.9 years, whereas the average age of
homeowners reported in the American Housing Survey (AHS) and American
Community Survey (ACS) is 52. Our (AHS) participants are 83.1 (79.1%)
Caucasian, and 61.0% (52.3%) are married with 51.1% (66.2%) having at
least one child. In sum, it appears our sample is reasonably reflective of
the overall homeowner profile across the United States with the possible
exception of age, which we address latter in the study.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for our sample when segmented by each of
our six (2×3) treatment effects. A cursory glance confirms that our random-
ization of respondents into one of the six pools appears successful in that both
the behavioral and demographic characteristics are relatively uniform across
pools. Although this is to be expected when collecting such a large sample,
we offer this table to preempt any concerns readers might have concerning
the randomization of participants into each pool.
Results
Table 2 reports the results from our main hypotheses. Each column in the
table corresponds to one of our six treatments. To examine whether or not
liquidated damages cause a person to move from viewing a contract as a
promise to perform to them now viewing a contract as a promise to either
perform or pay damages, we compare Columns (1) and (4). When adding
the liquidated damages clause to the scenario, the morality score changed by
0.316 (4.07 – 3.76) points, a statistically significant shift at the 95% level of
confidence.14
14One potential limitation of this study is whether the statistically significant results
are also economically significant. While economic significance is a matter of opinion,
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Table 1  Data collection summary statistics by respondent pool.
Liquidated No Liquidated
Damages Damages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strategic Economic Strategic Economic Full




Nine-point scale 3.99 3.93 3.67 3.73 3.64 3.83 3.79
Dummy 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.53 0.56
Home as an
investment
Nine-point scale 7.00 6.93 7.07 7.14 6.78 6.97 6.99
Dummy 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.08
Previous default (%) 5.92 4.71 6.43 6.17 6.43 5.82 6.19
Past Strategic default
(%)
11.11 14.29 5.00 15.00 5.00 14.29 10.83
Demographics
Children
Number of children 0.96 1.01 1.06 1.05 0.91 0.81 0.97
Dummy 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.48 0.49 0.51
Minority dummy 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.16 0.17
Male dummy 0.46 0.50 0.47 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.49
Married dummy 0.58 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.53 0.61
Income (seven-point
scale)
3.32 3.51 3.38 3.39 3.29 3.21 3.34
Net Worth
Nine-point scale 3.78 3.76 3.51 3.76 3.85 3.80 3.74
Positive net worth
dummy
0.66 0.67 0.58 0.66 0.68 0.65 0.65
Age 37.06 36.76 37.09 37.31 36.53 36.33 36.84
N 304 297 341 324 311 361 1,938
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sample segmented by respondent
pool for each of the six different treatments (a 2×3 experimental design). Blames the
Lender is measured on both a nine-point scale where 1 = the respondent more so
blames the lender, 9 = more so blames the homeowner, and as a dummy variable
where 1 = more so blames the lender, and 0 otherwise; Home as an Investment is
also measured on both a 9-point scale where 1 = the homeowner views his home as
more of an investment, 9 = homeowner views his home as more of a consumption
good and as a dummy variable where 1 = homeowner views his home as more of an
investment, and = 0 views as more of a consumption good. Previous Default (%) =
the % of respondents who have at any time defaulted on a mortgage. Past Strategic
Default (%) = the % of those defaults that were strategically in nature. Number of
Children reports the respondent’s number of dependent children; Child Dummy = 1 if
the respondent has at least one dependent child living at home, 0= otherwise. Minority
Dummy = 1 if the respondent is not Caucasian, 0 otherwise; Male Dummy = 1 for
men, 0 otherwise; Married Dummy 1 = married, 0 otherwise; Income is measured
on a seven-point scale from 1 (under $20,000) to 7 (over $100,000); Net Worth is
measured on a 9-point scale from 1 (less than -$400,000) to 9 (over $1,000,000); Age
is in years
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Table 2  Morality of mortgage default by liquidated damages and default intent.
Liquidated No Liquidated
Damages Damages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Morality Strategic Economic Strategic Economic
Score Neutral Default Default Neutral Default Default
Panel A: Frequency Distributions
1 14.1% 23.2% 3.2% 12.3% 23.2% 2.5%
2 11.2% 16.5% 2.1% 16.0% 15.1% 2.5%
3 18.8% 16.8% 6.2% 21.9% 22.8% 10.5%
4 13.5% 14.5% 8.8% 15.1% 10.6% 10.8%
5 17.4% 11.1% 16.7% 15.7% 11.6% 17.2%
6 10.5% 9.4% 21.7% 10.5% 7.1% 19.9%
7 5.6% 4.0% 18.2% 3.4% 3.2% 19.1%
8 8.9% 4.4% 23.2% 4.9% 6.4% 17.5%
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
x ̄ 4.07 3.40 5.87 3.76 3.39 5.61
σ 2 2.11 2.03 1.82 1.90 2.07 1.82
N 304 297 341 324 311 361
Panel B: Least Significant Difference—Post Hoc Tests
Liquidated damages vs. no liquidated damages  p-value
Neutral (no mention of reason) default 0.316 0.043**
Strategic mortgage default 0.015 0.926
Economic mortgage default 0.262 0.076*
Notes: This table reports the frequency of morality scores under six different treatments
(a 2×3 experimental design). Liquidated Damages refers to a clause conveyed to the
respondent as follows: “Within the mortgage contract, it states that if the borrower
fails to make his monthly payment, the home will be taken away and sold for whatever
the market will pay at that time. Any remaining amount still owed to the lender will
have to be paid by the borrower to make the lender ‘whole.’ In other words, the lender
will receive the same rate of return on this loan whether the borrower defaults or
not.” No Liquidated Damages refers to the absence of this clause in the treatment.
Neutral does not share the reason the couple defaulted on the mortgage. Strategic
Default shares that the couple can afford to make their payments, but has stopped
making monthly mortgage payments because they believe it is no longer in their best
financial interests. Economic Default shares that after a series of financial setbacks
brought on by an unexpected major illness, this couple is no longer able, and has
thus stopped making their monthly mortgage payments. Panel A reports the frequency
distribution, mean, standard deviation and sample size for all six treatments. Panel B
reports Least Significant Difference (LSD) Post Hoc tests of statistical significance.
 refers to the difference in the mean morality scores between paired treatments. *
indicates statistical significance at the 90% level; ** indicates statistical significance
at the 95% level; *** indicates statistical significance at the 99% level
we can partially deflect this concern by reasoning that a movement from 3.76 to 4.07
crosses over the threshold from not being willing to strategically default (less than or
equal to “4” on the 8-point scale) to a value above 4. Moving from one side of this
threshold to the other seems economically impactful.
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Confirming the ability of a liquidated damages clause to overturn the disjunc-
tive thesis, in general, we next shift our focus to whether or not default intent
has any influence over the way people view contracts (as a promise to perform
or a promise to either perform or pay damages). We find that default intent
makes a statistically significant difference. When an economic default is de-
scribed, liquidated damages remain significant in their ability to shift the way
people view a legal promise (Columns 3 vs. 6). However, when a strategic
mortgage default is described, the mean morality scores are almost identical
( = 0.015; P-value = 0.926).15 This implies that the perceived immorality
of strategic default overwhelms, even to the point of erasing, the liquidated
damages effect. Alternatively stated, in strategic default cases, the disjunctive
thesis holds true, whereas in economic default (or unknown default intent)
cases, it does not.16
Table 3 graphs the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the moral-
ity responses associated with the four treatments representing default intent
(strategic versus economic) and the presence or absence of liquidated dam-
ages. The space within the paired curves measures the liquidated damages
effect, whereas the space between the paired curves represents the default
intent (strategic vs. economic) effect. As is clearly pictorially evident, people
do not view strategic mortgage default as a moral action.
We next examine from a morality perspective if people view defaulting on
a mortgage the same way they view defaulting on other types of contracts.
To this end, we introduced an extension of the experiment to auto loans,
credit card debt and phone contracts. Below is the wording used in testing
the morality of defaulting on a car loan.
“A couple bought a car a while back. The car loan contract states that if the
borrower fails to make his monthly payment, the car will be taken away
and sold for whatever the market will pay at that time. Any remaining
amount still owed to the lender will have to be paid by the borrower to
make the lender “whole.” In other words, the lender will receive the same
rate of return on this loan whether the borrower defaults or not.
The couple has stopped making their monthly car payments.
15Of course, the scores are significantly lower which reflects a more immoral action.
16To clarify, in all cases, adding a liquidated damages clause makes it more acceptable
to pursue the alternative of a promise to pay damages. However, the only case where
this difference is not significant is in the strategic default case.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
scale
SD & LD ED & LD
SD & no LD ED & no LD
Notes: This graph conveys the cumulative distribution function of morality scores for
both strategic and economic defaults across liquidated damages and non-liquidated
damages treatments. Strategic Default (SD) shares that the couple can afford to make
their payments, but has stopped making monthly mortgage payments because they
believe it is no longer in their best financial interests. Economic Default (ED) shares
that after a series of financial setbacks brought on by an unexpected major illness,
this couple is no longer able, and has thus stopped making their monthly mortgage
payments. Liquidated Damages (LD) refers to a clause conveyed to the respondent as
follows: “Within the mortgage contract, it states that if the borrower fails to make his
monthly payment, the home will be taken away and sold for whatever the market will
pay at that time. Any remaining amount still owed to the lender will have to be paid
by the borrower to make the lender ‘whole.’ In other words, the lender will receive
the same rate of return on this loan whether the borrower defaults or not.” No LD
refers to the absence of this clause in the treatment
Please rate the morality of the couple no longer making their monthly
payments: scale 18 (1 = immoral  8 = moral)”
Note the intentional similarity in wording between the auto loan and mortgage
examination. In fact, all three additional examinations are consistently worded
to the fullest extent possible to allow for direct comparisons. In Table 4, the
three treatments (car, credit card and phone) all reflect the liquidated damages
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Table 4  Experimentally revealed preference: morality associated with defaulting
on car loans, credit cards and phone contracts.
Panel A: Frequency Distributions
Car Credit Card Phone ContractMorality
Score Freq. CDF Freq. CDF Freq. CDF
1 15.1% 15.1% 17.9% 17.9% 15.4% 15.4%
2 11.9% 27.1% 13.1% 31.0% 14.5% 30.0%
3 16.3% 43.3% 17.8% 48.7% 15.9% 45.8%
4 17.1% 60.4% 16.2% 64.9% 17.0% 62.8%
5 18.8% 79.2% 14.3% 79.2% 17.0% 79.9%
6 9.5% 88.7% 8.0% 87.3% 7.2% 87.1%
7 4.5% 93.2% 5.3% 92.6% 6.5% 93.5%
8 6.8% 100.0% 7.4% 100.0% 6.5% 100.0%
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
x̄ 3.93 3.78 3.85
σ 2 2.02 2.10 2.05
N 621 636 681







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
scale
Mortgage Car
Credit Card Phone Contract
Notes: This table reports the frequency of revealed preference morality scores associated with defaults on
three different types of contracts. No explanation was provided for the default, and all treatments expressed
Liquidated Damages. Car refers to the treatment where the following was explained to the participant: “A
couple bought a car a while back. The car loan contract states that if the borrower fails to make his monthly
payment, the car will be taken away and sold for whatever the market will pay at that time. Any remaining
amount still owed to the lender will have to be paid by the borrower to make the lender ‘whole.’ In other
words, the lender will receive the same rate of return on this loan whether the borrower defaults or not.” Credit
Card and Phone Contract refer to the second and third treatments where the couple stopped making payments
on their credit card and phone contract, respectively. The above language was adjusted accordingly. Panel A
reports the frequency distribution, mean, standard deviation and sample size for all three treatments. Panel B
graphs the CDFs for each loan type
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clauses and are all silent concerning the reason for default. In this sense, Panel
A of Table 4 is comparable to Column 1 in Panel A of Table 2. In addition to
the numerical reporting in Panel A, Panel B graphically depicts the extreme
similarity across loan types, suggesting consumers do not view the morality
of defaulting on these other types of contracts differentially.
Table 4 results are based on the experimentally revealed preference of the
consumer. That is, we compare the results derived from the experiments where
respondents do not know what we are testing. This is important because it
is much debated in the literature whether what people say they believe is
actually what they believe. Revealed preference tests, such as the ones we
have reported thus far, reveal participants’ true views of morality.
Where Table 4 reports experimentally revealed preference measures, Table 5
reports experimentally stated preference measures.17 Specifically, In Panel A,
we asked each participant to rate on an 8-point scale whether they believe
each of the four contract types represents and promise to perform (1) OR a
promise to either perform or pay damages (8). The tabular results in Panel
A are graphically depicted in Panel B. Notice that the scores are extremely
similar across loan type, but that these experimentally stated preference values
appear substantially lower than the experimentally revealed preference values
reported in the previous table. Table 6 performs a series of Paired-Samples
T-Tests and confirms that the results from Tables 4 and 5 are statistically
significantly different from each other. At a 99% level of significance, we find
there is a conflict between how people say they view the morality of defaulting
on a mortgage (and other installment loans) versus how they actually view
its morality.
When generating the results from a controlled experiment, most disciplines
find it only necessary to perform univariate statistics to reach conclusions.
The reason is as follows. When collecting transactions data, prices are ob-
served in a world where many other variables are changing simultaneously.
Thus, it is necessary to use a multivariate technique, such as multiple re-
gression, in an attempt to hold everything else constant. Alternatively, in a
17To conduct this test, we follow a within-subjects design. Our purpose in using a
between-subjects design in Table 4 is to gain an understanding of the sub-conscious
(experimentally revealed preference), whereas our purpose in using the within-subjects
design in Table 5 is to gain an understanding of the conscious (experimentally stated
preference). To avoid confusion, we want to clarify that a within-subjects design
does not offer more (or less) convincing results. Instead, it is an experimental design
variation needed when testing specific subhypotheses within the same treatments. In
Table 5, we are considering further hypotheses outside the main treatment effects, so
a within-subjects design is appropriate.
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Table 5  Experimentally stated preference: a promise to perform OR a promise to
perform or pay damages?.
Mortgage Car Credit Card Phone ContractPromise vs.
Compensate
Score Freq. CDF Freq. CDF Freq. CDF Freq. CDF
Panel A: Frequency Distributions
1 48.1% 48.1% 46.0% 46.0% 45.3% 45.3% 46.8% 46.8%
2 12.4% 60.5% 12.4% 58.5% 10.1% 55.4% 9.6% 56.4%
3 9.7% 70.2% 9.7% 68.2% 9.5% 64.9% 10.3% 66.7%
4 6.8% 77.0% 6.5% 74.7% 7.3% 72.2% 8.0% 74.7%
5 4.3% 81.3% 6.2% 80.9% 7.7% 79.9% 7.5% 82.2%
6 5.3% 86.6% 6.7% 87.5% 7.9% 87.8% 7.7% 89.9%
7 7.3% 93.9% 7.0% 94.5% 6.9% 94.7% 5.9% 95.8%
8 6.1% 100.0% 5.5% 100.0% 5.3% 100.0% 4.2% 100.0%
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
x̄ 2.82 2.90 3.00 2.87
σ 2 2.33 2.32 2.33 2.24
N 1,938 1,938 1,938 1,938









1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Scale
Mortgage Car
Credit Card Phone Contract
Notes: This table reports the frequency of distribution for the respondents’ opinion as
to whether each contract (Mortgages, Car Loans, Credit Cards, and Phone Contracts)
represents a promise to perform OR a promise to either perform or pay compensatory
damages. Panel A reports the frequency distribution, mean, standard deviation and
sample size for all four loan types. Panel B graphs the CDFs
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Table 6  Statistical difference between experimentally stated versus revealed pref-
erences.
Experimentally Stated Versus Revealed Preference
Contract Type Stated Preference Revealed Preference p-value
Mortgage 4.07 2.71 0.00***
Car 3.93 2.88 0.00***
Credit Card 3.78 3.04 0.00***
Cell Phone 3.85 3.13 0.00***
Notes: This table performs paired-samples T-tests for statistically differences between
experimentally stated versus revealed preferences for each type of contract (mortgages,
car loans, credit cards, and phone contracts). * indicates statistical significance at the
90% level; ** indicates statistical significance at the 95% level; *** indicates statistical
significance at the 99% level
controlled experiment, ceteris paribus is achieved on the front end of the
study by isolating only the variables of interest to be tested. Recognizing
the norm in real estate to use a regression-based approach for analysis,
we next turn to a model where we explain the morality scores relating
to our central hypothesis (the univariate results to which were reported in
Table 2) when adding a series of additional exogenous control variables.
The dependent variable is the morality score on a scale from 18. The first
set of independent variables is our treatment variables. Consistent with our
central hypotheses and as discussed throughout the paper, we expect these
five (N−1) treatments to be significant reflecting the significance of both the
liquidating damages clause and default intent.
The second group of independent variables contains six metrics. Blames
the Lender is a dummy variable that has been found to impact strategic
default viewpoints in that those who believe lenders are more to blame (than
homeowners) for the financial crisis are hypothesized to view default as
less immoral (Seiler et al. 2012). This is consistent with the Wilkinson-Ryan
(2012) argument of psychological contracts where when a borrower perceives
breach by the lender, the borrower’s most accessible retaliatory response is to
strategically default on the loan. As such, we hypothesize a positive coefficient
for this variable.
Home as an Investment dummy flags those who view his home as more of
an investment as opposed to a consumption good. When a borrower views
his home as more of an investment, we hypothesize he will see the default
decision as less of a moral issue and more of a financial one. Previous Default
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Table 7  Regression results explaining morality of default.
Model I Model II Model III
Independent Initial Model – Initial Model – Final
Variables Treatments Only All Variables Model
Intercept 4.07*** 4.14*** 3.92***
(0.11) (0.22) (0.16)
Treatment pools
LD & Strategic Default −0.67*** −0.69*** −0.70***
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
LD & Economic Default 1.80*** 1.78*** 1.79***
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
No LD & Neutral Default −0.32** −0.31** −0.31**
(0.16) (.15) (0.15)
No LD & Strategic Default −0.69*** −0.71*** −0.71***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
No LD & Economic Default 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.58
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Behavioral characteristics
Blames the lender 0.76*** 0.77***
(0.09) (0.09)
Home as an investment 0.05
(0.16)
Previous default 0.47** 0.49***
(0.19) (0.19)
Past Strategic default 1.19** 1.14**
(0.56) (0.56)





Child dummy −0.17* −0.23***
(0.10) (0.09)











Table 7  Continued.
Model I Model II Model III
Independent Initial Model – Initial Model – Final
Variables Treatments Only All Variables Model
Observations 1,938 1,938 1,938
F-statistic 107.68 41.87 63.85
p-value 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00***
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.26 0.26
Notes: This table reports the results from three regressions where the dependent
variable is the morality measure on an 8-point scale where 1 = Not at all Moral
to 8 = Completely Moral. The Treatment Pools section includes five of the six
(N−1) treatments (where the Liquidated Damages with No Reason given for the
mortgage default serves as the holdout group). LD & Strategic Default represents
the treatment when the person strategically defaulted under a liquidated damages
clause; LD & Economic Default is when the person economically defaulted under a
liquidated damages clause; No LD & Neutral Default is when there was no reason
given for the default and no liquidated damages clause; No LD & Strategic Default is
when the person strategically defaulted and there was no liquidated damages clause;
No LD & Economic Default is when the person economically defaulted and there
was no liquidated damages clause; The Behavioral Characteristics section includes
six variables. Blames the Lender is measured as a dummy variable where 1 = the
respondent more so blames the lender, 0 otherwise; Home as an Investment = 1 when
the homeowner views his home as more of an investment, and = 0 when it is viewed
as more of a consumption good. Previous Default = 1 if the respondent previously
defaulted on a mortgage, 0 otherwise. Past Strategic Default = 1 if the respondent has
strategically defaulted on a mortgage in the past. Problem State reflects those states
hardest hit by the housing crisis (AZ, CA, FL, MI, and NV). Recourse State = 1
when the state is a recourse state, 0 otherwise. Demographic includes six variables.
Child Dummy = 1 if the respondent has at least one dependent child living at home,
0 = otherwise. Minority Dummy = 1 if the respondent is not Caucasian, 0 otherwise;
Male Dummy = 1 for men, 0 otherwise; Married Dummy 1 = married, 0 otherwise.
Model I reports results from including only the five (N-1) treatment effects. Model
II reports results from including all explanatory variables, while Model III reports
only final model results where all the variables are significant. * indicates statistical
significance at the 90% level; ** indicates statistical significance at the 95% level; ***
indicates statistical significance at the 99% level. Standard errors are reported inside
the parentheses
is a dummy for whether or not the respondent has defaulted on a mortgage in
the past, whereas Past Strategic Default is a dummy marking the past default
as being strategic in nature. Past studies such as Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2013) use a variable that asks respondents what percentage of all the people
they know who have defaulted did so strategically. This hearsay measure is
wrought with all sorts of measurement error, and as such, we use a much
more direct question. We hypothesize the sign on these two variables to be
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positive because having gone through a default in the past makes one more
empathetic and less judgmental.
The final two independent variables in this section are concatenated with
the dataset to incorporate state-level market conditions that may influence
respondents. Problem State is a dummy variable that reflects those states
hardest hit by the housing crisis (AZ, CA, FL, MI and NV). Homeowners
who live in these states have observed a greater incidence of default around
them, which we hypothesize would make them more understanding of those
who have gone through the process. Thus, we expect a positive sign on this
variable. Finally, Recourse State is a dummy variable flagging those states
where the lender can come after the borrower in the event of default.
The third section includes a series of demographic variables (whether the per-
son has children, ethnicity, gender, marital status, income and net worth) not
because of any hypothesized relations, but more of an explanatory exercise.18
As such, we leave sign expectations as an open-ended empirical question.19
In Model I, only the five (N−1) treatments are included. As hypothesized,
and consistent with our univariate findings, all five treatments are statistically
significant and carry a sign consistent with the univariate results from Table
2. This means that a liquidated damages clause does lead people to shift
their view of a mortgage contract from a strict promise to perform to more
of either a promise to perform or pay compensatory damages. Concerning
strategic default, when people learn the reason for the default was intentional,
there is a strong sense of immorality condemning the actions of the borrower.
Relatively speaking, the strategic default effect exceeds the strength of the
liquidated damages effect.
In Model II, all explanatory variables are included. In addition to the treatment
effects remaining robust, blaming the lender, having previously defaulted,
particularly when that default was strategic in nature, and living in a problem
state, are also significant. Concerning demographic data, having children is
associated with a significantly less moral viewpoint towards default. Finally,
18Although we do not ask for education level or occupation, we argue that these
variables are sufficiently proxied by metrics such as income and net worth.
19We originally included Age as an independent demographic variable in our model,
but no matter how Age was specified (directly, or when broken into various buckets),
the variable was never significant. Moreover, at the request of a reviewer, we tested
whether examining a subsample of homeowners closer in age to that of the national
average of all homeowners might affect the results. As a robustness check, we restricted
the sample to those plus and minus 10 years of the national average homeowner age
of 52 years, and the results remain virtually unchanged.
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minorities view mortgage default as less immoral. In Model III, only the
significant variables remain. It is worthy of noting that all the variables that
are significant in Model II remain significant in Model III, our final model.20
Conclusion
This study tests the long-debated “disjunctive thesis” as it applies to a resi-
dential mortgage setting. Specifically, we examine the ability of a liquidated
damages clause in a mortgage contract to shift ones view from a promise
to perform to an option to either perform or pay compensatory damages.
We reject the disjunctive thesis by finding that a liquidated damages clause
does in fact shift views toward an option to either perform or pay. However,
when the mortgage breach is strategic in nature, the disjunctive thesis holds;
people view the breach of mortgage with and without the liquidated dam-
ages clause as being statistically indistinguishable. Simply stated, the results
clearly demonstrate that a liquidation clause causes a person’s view to shift
from a promise to perform to either a promise to perform OR pay just com-
pensation. The exception to this statement is that if the default is strategic in
nature, focus is shifted to morality and people revert back to the mortgage
contract as strictly a promise to perform.
Consistent with other common installment contracts such as auto loans, credit
cards and phone contracts, people say they view mortgage default as being
immoral (an experimentally stated preference measure). However, when an
experimentally revealed preference measure is taken, we find that people truly
view default as being significantly less immoral. This discrepancy between
experimentally stated and revealed preferences is not uncommon and is the
reason we took the extra measure to control for this in our study.
When identifying disparate moral viewpoints on mortgage default, we find
that (beyond our main treatment effects), those who blame lenders more so
than borrowers for the financial crisis, those who have previously defaulted
(particularly when that past default was strategic in nature), those who live in
the hardest hit states during the financial crisis, those without children, and
minorities significantly view default as less immoral.
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